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Abstract 
 
This study investigates an under-researched topic: individual-to-individual or team-to-team 
interactions during the alliance pre-formation phase. We develop a general theory based on 
the principle of congruity for understanding the micro-dynamics of the alliance formation 
process. The attitudes of each party in an alliance towards their prospective partner depend on 
the level of mismatch between their initial evaluations of the contributions of each partner, 
and on their wish intensity and speed to reach congruity. The impact of different managerial 
cultural backgrounds (special theory) and mind-sets (special theory application) are 
theorized. Further applications are considered and all are presented as testable propositions. 
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The principle of congruity in the analysis of international business 
cooperation 
1. Introduction 
Efforts to understand individual-to-individual or team-to-team interactions during the final 
alliance pre-formation phase are scarce. Besides game theory (e.g., Parkhe, 1993; Seale, 
Arend, & Phelan, 2006), a few attempts to further the theoretical understanding of the micro-
dynamics of the process of forming alliances have been reported in the literature, such as 
theoretical models regarding the development of trust (see Bhattacharya, Devinney, & 
Pillutla, 1998; Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012; Jones & George, 1998; Kim, Dirks, & Cooper, 2009; 
Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998). To date most alliance theories focus on the antecedents 
and consequences of alliance formation. Furthermore, calls for furthering understanding of 
the micro-aspects of intergroup interaction have been made in recent years (e.g., Ferrin, 
Bligh, & Kohles, 2008; Song, 2009).  
In order to address these gaps, we offer an application of the principle of congruity to alliance 
formation. The principle of congruity (Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955) proposes that 
evaluations or re-evaluations of objects by an individual tend to seek congruity with that 
individual’s frame of reference. Subjective valuation differences have also been identified in 
other business contexts and models attempting to make compatible these subjective views 
have been put forward (e.g., Weingartner & Gavish, 1993). The exploration of alternative 
actions to forming a partnership is likely to increase the negotiating power of the actor 
(Malhotra & Gino, 2011), which in our case could mean higher disappointment with an 
evaluation from the other party in an alliance. In general, parties that develop a positive 
atmosphere or good rapport with each other are more likely to reach a mutually satisfying 
outcome (Jap, Robertson, & Hamilton, 2011). It has been also suggested that understanding 
the other party’s frame of reference as well as using messages consisting of informational or 
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relational content may help to establish a positive atmosphere (Chung, Sternquist, & Chen, 
2006; Srivastava & Chakravarti, 2009).  This closely parallels the ideas of Buckley and 
Casson (1988), who suggest ‘mutual forbearance’ as the key to success in joint ventures. 
We organise this conceptual study into three stages. First, we develop a general theory based 
on the principle of congruity, and a reverse interpretation of that principle, extended to the 
case of alliance formation. Second, we develop a special theory considering the impact of 
cultural differences between the parties. Third, we present an application of the special theory 
- the case of different mind-sets between managers/entrepreneurs of developed countries and 
those from emerging economies. This novel extension of the above theory to the context of 
alliance formation adds to the understanding of the micro-dynamics of interactions between 
individuals (or between teams).  
The use of alliance-based cross-border strategies has intensified in recent years in many 
business sectors (e.g., Gulati, Lavie, & Singh, 2009; McDermott & Corredoira, 2010). 
However, the success rate of transnational alliances (TAs) in general is low, with figures of 
40 per cent and below commonly being cited, although in a few sectors (such as 
biotechnology) or in firms from a particular country (e.g., Japan) success rates are somewhat 
higher (see Delios & Beamish, 2004; Kale & Singh, 2009; Lunnan & Haugland, 2008). This 
is an issue of importance for organizations in general, since the costs of failure can be 
considerable (Wassmer, Dussauge, & Planellas, 2010). Moreover, in the case of TAs, it 
becomes even more crucial when other factors (such as cultural differences) have the 
potential to increase the likelihood of inter-partner conflict (see Barkema & Vermeulen, 
1997; Marino, Strandholm, Steensma, & Weaver, 2002). Such situations could, for instance, 
increase the chances of differing evaluations of the contributions of each partner, which may 
lead eventually to a negative outcome. A strong relationship between partners should have 
positive effects on the venture’s long-term results (Yan & Gray, 2001). 
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In our study, we propose that the attitude towards the other party is likely to be influenced by 
the congruence or incongruence of the parties’ initial evaluations regarding the prospective 
contributions of each party (including one’s own) to the alliance, and ultimately, this will 
affect the feasibility of the alliance. In other words, our theoretical framework sheds light on 
the micro-dynamics of the interaction between mismatched partner-contribution evaluations – 
a potential source of disagreement and dispute during the establishment of the alliance – and 
the attitudes of managers from the potential partner firms. Drawing on congruity theory, we 
consider a possible causal link between conflicting partner expectations regarding 
contributions to the alliance, together with the effect of the attitudes of the managers 
formalising the alliance towards each other on the one hand, and the likelihood of successful 
alliance formation on the other. Our theoretical approach assumes that incongruous 
expectations regarding partners’ contributions amongst prospective partners have the 
potential to impact negatively upon the decision-making process of one or both parties at the 
time that the alliance is about to be formed and thereafter (cf. Inkpen & Currall, 2004). It may 
also have a cumulative effect on managerial judgement regarding the viability of such a 
partnership. One key factor for establishing and developing a successful TA between 
unrelated foreign companies is the ability to manage effectively those disputes that might 
later undermine the commitment of one or more of the parties to the agreement. One 
approach that should increase our understanding about the formation of effective alliances is 
to build upon a theory and framework that have originated in other domains.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the 
principle of (in)congruity, its assumptions and prior usage. Subsequently, we develop a 
general theory, based on the principle of congruity, to inform understanding of the micro-
dynamics of prospective partners’ interactions in the alliance formation process. We go on to 
develop a special theory regarding the effect of cultural differences on the process of alliance 
  
 
5 
 
 
formation. We then illustrate the special theory through a hypothetical illustration that 
highlights the effect of different mind-sets in the formation of an alliance between a firm 
from a developed country and a counterpart from an emerging economy (e.g., a BRIC 
country). Finally, we conclude and propose implications for academics, practitioners, and 
policy-makers. 
2. Background 
2.1. Contextual Issues 
A key contextual issue in this study is business alliances between two firms, specifically 
transnational alliances (TAs). A business alliance between two firms implies a sharing of 
resources between the partners (Glaister & Buckley, 1996), and it is usually seen as an 
expansion strategy involving lower resource commitment, which in turn decreases 
perceptions of business risks associated with the new venture. The term covers a range of 
joint activities or commitments (Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004).  
A number of models have attempted to capture the intricacies of cooperative 
agreements, and may also be applied to alliances. Models of cooperation have drawn on a 
range of theoretical frameworks, from game-theory (e.g., Katz, 1986) and economics (e.g., 
Buckley & Casson, 1996; Contractor, 1985), resource dependency (e.g., Pfeffer, 1972; 
Pfeffer & Nowak, 1976; Van de Ven, 1976) transaction-costs economics (Buckley & Strange, 
2010; Hennart, 1988; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992; Williamson, 1979, 1991) and strategy views 
(Fornell, Lorange, & Roos, 1990; Glaister & Buckley, 1996; Harrigan, 1988; Kogut, 1991), 
through to relational exchange (Dhanaraj, Lyles, Steensma, & Tihanyi, 2004; Kale, Singh, & 
Perlmutter, 2000; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995) and knowledge-based perspectives (Grant & 
Baden-Fuller, 2004; Hamel, 1991; Kogut, 1988). These theories advance the understanding 
of alliances by focusing on the antecedents and consequences of alliance formation. 
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Nonetheless, they do not shed much light on the micro-level evaluations leading to micro-
level tactical decisions just prior to the conclusion of the agreement.  
A stream of literature associated with our topic concerns intergroup trust (e.g., Doney, 
Cannon, & Mullen, 1998; Lander & Kooning, 2013; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; 
McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998; Song, 2009). Our framework identifies micro-
dynamic mechanisms during interactions prior to alliance formation. Those micro-
interactions may lead ultimately to higher levels of trust between the parties; however, the 
scope of our framework does not presume initial levels of trust, nor does it attempt to predict 
outcomes beyond the alliance formation stage. We further argue that our framework differs 
from those frameworks that focus on trust, because the parties are not at risk (see Mayer et 
al.’s (1995) definition of risk); the setting of pre-alliance formation assumes a voluntary 
process in which either party may walk away should they decide to do so (e.g., in the event of 
no prospective benefits being perceived from the agreement). Therefore, this condition pre-
empts the notion of partner vulnerability and the associated need for trust.  
Extant theorizing is less helpful in furthering our understanding of the micro-
dynamics of alliances’ final pre-formation stage, when the prospective partners’ contributions 
to the alliance are evaluated, usually at team-to-team or individual-to-individual meetings, 
and the agreement about who is bringing what to the alliance is concluded. The expectations 
formed at this stage, which are the basis for the decision-making process, are influenced by 
different types of bias due, for instance, to the processing of information by each 
individual/manager involved, as well as by the interaction with other individuals/managers if 
they are part of a team (Carter, 1971). One of the key factors in establishing and developing a 
successful TA between unrelated foreign companies is the ability to manage effectively the 
disputes arising (Fey & Beamish, 2000) that might later undermine the commitment of one or 
more of the parties to the agreement.  
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2.2. The principle of (in)congruity 
The principle of congruity (Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955) was developed by social 
psychologists in the 1950s to explore instances of attitude change. Subsequently, it has been 
applied to or mentioned in the areas of politics (e.g., Brady & Sniderman, 1985; Kirkpatrick 
& McLemore, 1977; Shapiro, 1969) and consumer marketing, particularly in advertising and 
branding (e.g., Aaker & Keller, 1990; Olshavsky & Miller, 1972; Perkins & Forehand, 2012; 
Salciuviene, Ghauri, Streder, & De Mattos, 2010; Zhang, 2010). So far as we know, the 
present study represents the first application of congruity theory to international business 
cooperation. We should note here that the principle of congruity refers to individual action 
and it differs, therefore, from concepts of congruence or congruity at the organization level, 
usually denoting strategic fit between firms (e.g., Bierly & Gallagher, 2007). 
The essence of congruity theory is that changes in the evaluation of a phenomenon (or 
concept) by an individual are always in the direction of increased congruity with the existing 
frame of reference of that individual (Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955). In other words, 
congruity theory predicts that a change in the attitude of one individual or party is dependent 
upon the degree of congruity between the assertions made by another individual or party and 
the former individual’s frame of reference, as these assertions manifest themselves during 
interactions between the two. Here, the dependency of one’s behavior on the actions or 
behaviors of others in a negotiation parallels the concept of relational-self (see Gelfand, 
Major, Raver, Nishii, & O'Brien, 2006). We may assume causality in two directions. In one 
direction, say positive causality, individuals will tend to agree with those who hold similar 
frames of reference expressed by similar views or evaluations of objects or actors. In another 
direction, say reverse causality, individuals will tend to adjust their frames of reference to 
compensate for dissimilar views or evaluations of objects or actors held by others. Thus, in 
the former case congruity is achieved through holding similar views, whereas in the latter 
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case (henceforth referred to as reverse interpretation) congruity is achieved by adjusting one’s 
frame of reference to dissimilar views or evaluations regarding objects or actors.  
The necessary participation of individuals (i.e., managers or executives) at the 
concluding stage of alliance agreements (even as part of a team) supports the use of 
psychology research on individual decision-making processes, such as congruity theory; this, 
in turn, can be expected to deepen our understanding of the final stage of the allying process. 
Social interaction among individuals, as well as the context in which these interactions occur, 
are the basis for the development of any theory in the social sciences (Bales, 1950). Our main 
purpose here is to hypothesise about a generalised pattern of behavior regarding the 
conclusion of the alliance agreement. 
Some of the general assumptions underlying theories on the psychology of individual 
decision-making such as congruity theory are as follows: 
a) Individuals (alone or as part of a team) will either take or influence decisions or both. 
In general, observable social phenomena comprise both overt interactions among 
individuals and the situation or context in which these interactions take place. It may 
include the self, other individuals and physical objects (Bales, 1950). In particular, we 
assume that, underlying the interactions that may be observed, there are interactions 
with the self which are not observable overtly, as are interactions with other 
individuals or those with objects (Bales 1950). We assume that interactions with the 
self-influence the decision-making process of individuals or, more specifically in our 
case, managers.  
b) Those decisions will draw on each individual’s past experiences or knowledge-base 
and how each individual respectively processes and employs that information.  
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c) Individual and/or team interactions between prospective partners will also generate 
information that will in turn be fed into each individual’s knowledge-base as 
described above. 
d) If an individual is part of a team, his or her influence on the final decision regarding 
any item will also reflect the hierarchical structure and decision-making rules within 
the team. For instance, assuming a leadership structure, the attitude of individuals 
positioned closer to the team’s decision-maker will have greater influence relative to 
individuals who are more distant from the decision-maker. This parallels ideas related 
to the effects of the homophily principle – ties between individuals brought about by 
perceived similarities (e.g., McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001).  
These assumptions lead to areas where current understanding is obscure, such as the 
dynamic process through which individual decisions are formed and how these influence 
decisions developed by the team through interactions within its members.  
Although our study focuses on the micro-dynamics of interactions in the context of 
alliance formation, we make assumptions regarding the macro-environment in which these 
proposed micro-interactions take place, using existing conceptual frameworks.  This should 
clarify the impact of critical macro-environment factors, which may significantly affect the 
potential testability of the propositions presented later in the paper, on our process model. It 
should also support the future testability of the model through empirical research. Further 
research should be able to systematically disentangle the proposed effects and validate the 
propositions outlined later in the paper. Such prior circumstances may mold the frames of 
reference used in managerial decision-making, thus influencing both process and outcome, 
and should highlight the boundary conditions and possible limitations of our proposed 
conceptual framework.  
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The context of our study considers a dyadic (two-party) alliance context rather than one 
associated with an alliance network (Koka & Prescott, 2002) or multi-party alliance (i.e. an 
alliance constellation) (Das & Teng, 2002). Within this context, we shall clarify our 
assumptions regarding the firms’ social embeddedness (Hagedoorn, 2006), status similarity 
(Chung, Singh, & Lee, 2000; Podolny, 1993, 1994), the amount of inter-firm social capital 
(Inkpen & Tsang, 2005; Koka & Prescott, 2002), inter-relationships between organizational 
activities such as innovation (Stuart, 1998), and the existence of prior ties (Gulati, 1995a, 
1995b).  
First, considering the three levels of embeddedness of a firm as proposed by Hagedoorn 
(2006), and in order to keep our process framework simple, we assume with regard to 
environmental country-specific and industry-specific factors (i.e. environmental 
embeddedness) high complexity and uncertainty arising from local business practices (such 
as those in large emerging markets) and high-technology sector constraints and uncertainties 
(such as those in biotechnology sectors). Relative to the history of the parties regarding 
alliance attempts, (i.e., interorganisational embeddedness) as well as personal network links 
between individuals across organizations (i.e., dyadic embeddedness), we assume, for 
simplicity, the absence of any prior contact in both cases. These assumptions will adequately 
represent the case of firms from a developed country approaching emerging-economy 
counterparts in a high-technology sector for the first time.  
The relative status of prospective partners is another factor that may impact alliance 
formation prospects. Chung et al. (2000) suggest that the relative status of prospective 
partners is usually assessed prior to alliance-formation attempts. The perceived quality of a 
firm’s products is a measure of the status of such firms (Podolny, 1993). The simplest 
assumption in this case, and the one we adopt, will be of equal status between partners. One 
may argue, however, that status will depend on the social dynamics of a specific business 
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environment; for instance, a local firm may have high status locally, without being known in 
broader contexts (e.g. the global environment). We therefore assume that whatever 
differences may exist in status between two firms, this will be considered as part of the 
potential contributions firms may offer to, or aim to retrieve as a benefit from, the 
partnership. 
A further factor that may affect efforts to create and alliance concerns the amount of 
inter-firm social capital, which emphasizes the benefits harvested through previous social 
links (Portes, 1998), highlighting rational individual decision-making and motivation within 
the constraints of a social environment (Coleman, 1988). Benefits accrued through social 
links, such as access to relevant information, may facilitate the establishment of an alliance, 
particularly if they support the process of generating or strengthening trust, concomitantly 
curbing opportunism (Inkpen & Tsang, 2005). Social capital associated with an alliance 
network may support, for instance, the selection of appropriate partners, skilled in relevant 
capabilities and resources (Gulati, 1995a); it should also positively affect knowledge transfer 
between partners after the alliance is established (Koka & Prescott, 2002). The perceived 
mutual benefits to be realized through sharing resources may in turn strengthen the positive 
drive towards alliance formation (Gulati, 1995a). 
In this study, each area of knowledge potentially available through an alliance, such as 
knowledge on alliance or network management practices or novel technology (Inkpen & 
Tsang, 2005), may be seen as a contribution from one of the partners to the alliance and 
should generate expectations regarding its value and impact. Aiming to simplify our model, 
we assume that intra-firm social capital is non-existent, or in the initial phases of 
development - in other words, a situation characterized by an abundance of ‘structural holes’ 
(Burt, 1997), which increases the potential opportunities for establishing value-adding intra-
firm links. We further assume that the interacting firms are aware of the limitations that each 
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may carry into the alliance and the benefits they may achieve by accessing their partner’s 
capabilities and resources through the alliance. Such arguments are popular among resource-
dependence theorists. If each opportunity for beneficial resource-sharing is seen as a potential 
contribution to the alliance, what differs is the importance or value assigned to each potential 
contribution. This is the gap investigated in this study. 
In addition, the similarity of firms’ technological bases should affect alliance formation 
positively (Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1998), as there should be a stronger mutual 
understanding of the technology to be shared through alliance (Stuart, 1998). Moreover, not 
only may technology be a potential contribution, but the firm’s capacity to absorb a particular 
technology (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) may be seen as a contribution to the ultimate goal of 
forming an effective alliance. Our assumption here is that both knowledge and the capacity to 
absorb it exist respectively at specified levels, and they are perceived as prospective 
contributions and considered as such in our process framework. 
Another factor that may influence alliance formation is the level of similarity in inter-firm 
status (Podolny, 1994; Chung et al., 2000; Shipilov, Li, & Greve, 2011), as well as a firm’s 
accumulation of status through links with better-known players (Shipilov & Li, 2008). 
Current understanding suggests that uncertain environments tend to be associated with 
alliance formation between firms of similar status, although this trend may only be observed 
if the level of economic activity in a particular market is in decline (Collet & Philippe, 2014). 
Considering international alliances, it is challenging to ascertain a measure of a firm’s status 
because of the contextual importance of local versus international standing. However, it 
would seem reasonable to assume that a firm will only contemplate firms above a certain 
status level as prospective matches, even if only considering the local context. For instance, a 
foreign partner will most likely consider allying with one of the top local firms, even though 
they may not have any significant international standing. 
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Finally, a history of previous alliances will also tend to affect collaboration prospects 
positively (Gulati, 1995b). This seems to be the case when such previous ties are conducted 
and concluded successfully and without major conflict. Cases where a firm is removed from 
consideration as a prospective partner due to conflict generated in previous interactions have 
not been investigated to our knowledge, although such action might reasonably be expected. 
For simplification, our assumption here is that there has been no business interaction prior to 
the attempt that serves as context to this study. Although we exclude here firms that have had 
previous ties, we acknowledge that some past connections of a social rather than business 
nature may exist, even if such connections were generated through the business-deal initiative 
under scrutiny. We might expect that the non-existence of prior ties could work as a deeper 
underlying factor regarding the level of mismatch in critical evaluation of the contributions of 
each partner, the magnitude and scope of the wish intensity and the speed of searching 
congruence.  
In order to further simplify our model, we assume that each party follows a leader or 
decision-maker whose attitudes and opinions drive the sequence of interactions towards a 
possible agreement. By doing this, we focus on one individual's (the leader) decision-making 
process rather than that of the team. One implication of congruity theory is that individuals 
are more likely to place greater importance or value on people who hold beliefs that are more 
congruent with their own belief system or frame of reference. These assumptions may be 
made more complex at a later stage of the theory-building process.  
3. Model Development 
3.1. A general theory: Application of congruity theory to alliance formation 
In this section we first extend congruity theory to alliance formation using a reverse 
interpretation. We demonstrate our proposition by making a small number of assumptions in 
order to simplify the model and to allow us to focus on the essence of our interpretation of the 
  
 
14 
 
 
principle of congruity. Finally, we include possible mediator variables and derive a general 
theory. We look at the interaction between managers considering their valuation of the 
contributions of each partner and their attitude towards the other party. We propose that, 
ceteris paribus, different sequences of micro-interactions may lead to diverse (even 
opposing) likely outcomes. Our proposed approach using congruity theory addresses the 
knowledge gap regarding individual-to-individual or team-to-team interactions in the 
concluding stages of alliance pre-formation, when the final agreement regarding the partners’ 
contributions to the alliance is reached. In other words, the congruity approach allows us to 
predict the micro-dynamics of the interaction of managers prior to finalising an alliance 
agreement.  
Analysis using congruity theory can be extended to the case of dyadic (two-party) 
business alliance formation by considering the attitudes of both partners towards each other, 
together with their evaluations of the contributions they expect to bring to the alliance, as 
well as of those contributions they expect from the potential alliance partner. The attitude of 
one prospective alliance Partner (P1) (i.e. an individual or team within that firm) towards 
another prospective alliance Partner (P2) is dependent on the cumulative effect of the 
(in)congruity of P1’s attitudes towards a number of objects of judgement and P2’s attitudes 
towards the same objects. Thus, we may define the initial Frame of Reference of P1 (FR1) in 
the context of a dyadic alliance as the initial attitude of P1 towards P2 (A1,2 ), together with 
the original attitude (or evaluation) (t=0) of P1 towards the k potential contributions (Ck) to 
the alliance by P2, plus the original attitude (t=0) of P1 towards their own k’ potential 
contributions (Ck’) to the alliance. Thus, FR1 comprises A1,2 as well as At=0,i=1,Ck,j (where A 
stands for attitude; “t=0” for time “0” or initial attitude;  “i=1” for P1; and “j” takes values of 
“1” – relative to P1, and “2” – relative to P2) (see Figure 1). We also define the congruity of 
attitudes between P1 and P2 towards the contribution k of P2 (CACk,2) and the contribution k’ 
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of P1 (CACk’,1). The Total Attitude Congruency for a two-party alliance will be a function of 
the added effects of CACk’,1 and CACk,2, that is, CAtotal= f (CACk’,1 ; CACk,2) or, assuming a 
cumulative linear effect, CAtotal=∑k CAck’,1 + ∑k’ CAck,2. In other words, the attitude of P1 
towards P2 at a certain point in time (t=1) depends on the initial attitude of P1 towards P2 
(i.e., t=0) plus the effect of the (in)congruence of various attitudes (i.e., based on subjective 
evaluations) between P1 and P2 towards items or features linked to the deal – for simplicity 
in our case the prospective contributions of each partner. This can be expressed as: 
At=1,1,2=At=0,1,2 + CAtotal, where CAtotal=∑k CAck’,1 + ∑k’ CAck,2, where: At=1,1,2 is the attitude 
of P1 towards P2 at time t=1, and At=0,1,2 is the attitude of P1 towards P2 at time t=0, and 
CAtotal is the overall congruence between the attitudes of P1 (ACk’,1) and P2 (ACk,2) regarding 
the contributions of each partner (Ck’ and Ck) and assuming a cumulative linear effect. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
Following the principle of congruity, these changes of attitude may be generated by 
the degree of conformity or match between P1’s initial expectations regarding each partner’s 
contribution and P2’s expectations, regarding, respectively, each of those contributions. A 
simplified demonstration follows.  
Let us further assume that the initial attitude of P1 towards P2 is neutral (A1,2=0) - a 
realistic assumption when firms attempt to establish an alliance for the first time. Should P1 
possess any negative information about P2, P1 will not proceed with the arrangement. 
Consider the possible attitudes of both partners regarding contribution 1 of P2 (C1,2). Let us 
further consider only two possible attitudes favourable or positive (+1), and indifferent or 
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neutral (0). If P1’s attitude towards P2 is initially neutral, we can focus our attention on the 
congruence of attitudes between P1 and P2 towards the alliance partners’ contributions. Both 
partners could potentially bring to the alliance ‘k’ different contributions and each partner 
would have an initial expectation considering each respective contribution by each partner. 
Next, we focus attention on the original attitudes towards the contributions of each 
partner. Table 1 illustrates possible congruity or incongruity of expectations between partners 
regarding Contribution 1 of P2 (C1,2), as well as the resultant levels of congruity or 
incongruity. Based on the principle of congruity, we would expect that instances where there 
is congruence regarding the indifferent evaluation of C1,2 (lower right cell) will not cause any 
change in P1’s frame of reference. Instances where there is congruity about favourable 
perspectives (upper left cell) should affect positively P2’s image in P1’s frame of reference. 
The instances of incongruity (lower left and upper right cells) indicate conflicting perceptions 
or evaluations and should influence negatively P1’s perception of P2 within P1’s frame of 
reference. This procedure can be repeated for each of the k contributions of Partner 2 
(CAck,2), and, assuming a cumulative linear effect, will result in a Total Attitude 
(In)Congruence of CAtotal=∑k CAck,2 . 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
According to the principle of congruity, the tendency is to reach maximum congruity 
with one’s frame of reference. Taking as an example the situation indicated by the lower left 
cell (i.e., one of the incongruous instances), P2’s assertion regarding C1,2 conflicts with P1’s 
initial frame of reference. Assuming that attitudes towards C1,2 do not change, then P1’s 
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evaluation of P2 will tend to become more negative in order to reach congruity (see Figure 2 
for t=1). A negative (rather than neutral) attitude towards P2 counter-balances the relatively 
negative evaluation of P2 regarding C1,2. Or, considering another direction for the effect, a 
prospective partner (evaluator) who is perceived negatively is expected to make (relatively) 
negative evaluations of the objects under scrutiny, in our case contribution C1,2 , and thus 
congruity is maintained. 
If similar evaluations are put forward when P1 is examining C2,2, then P1’s perception 
of P2 will become even more negative. We could repeat this for all ‘k’ contributions of each 
partner. It seems reasonable to expect that the more incongruous are the evaluations of P2 
regarding each of his own k contributions (Ck,2), the less likely it is that the conclusion of an 
alliance will lead to a successful outcome. The magnitude of this effect may be culture-
dependent as we point out in the next section.  
Extending this thinking to the formation of alliances between independent firms, it 
can be argued that incongruence concerning the contributions to a transnational alliance 
expected by the respective partners will influence negatively the attitudes of managers as they 
exchange information during the early phases of discussion and reaching agreement. 
Following De Dreu, Weingart and Kwon (2000), this negative attitude may then affect 
unfavourably the atmosphere in which discussions are held and the ability for a mutually 
acceptable agreement to be concluded, to the detriment of current and future relationships and 
dealings between the firms.  
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
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 Thus, based on the above discussion, a theoretical link between different perceptions 
regarding the potential contributions of partners of an alliance and the chances of successful 
alliance formation can be established. 
If we include moderator functions or variables, we arrive at a general proposition as follows. 
At=1,1,2=At=0,1,2 + fa (CAtotal, ∑m Mm)                                    (1) 
 Where:  
At=1,1,2 is the attitude of P1 towards P2 at time t=1,  
At=0,1,2 is the attitude of P1 towards P2 at time t=0,  
fa = function representing the congruity and the adaptation effects; 
CAtotal=∑k CAck’,1 + ∑k’ CAck,2, representing the cumulative congruity or incongruity 
regarding the contributions of each partner. CAtotal is the overall congruence between the 
Attitudes of P1 (ACk’,1) and P2 (ACk,2) regarding the contributions of each partner (Ck’ and Ck) 
and assuming a cumulative linear effect; 
Mm (m=1,2,3, …, r) refer to ‘r’ moderator-variables that will  impact on the adaptation of the 
congruity function, such as, cultural differences among parties, different mind-sets, and 
different genders, or their combined effects. 
 
In general, we could say that the attitude of one prospective partner (P1) (i.e., an individual or 
team within that firm) towards another prospective alliance partner (P2) is dependent on: (a) 
the initial attitude of P1 towards P2; (b) on the total (in)congruity (CAtotal) or the 
(in)congruity of P1’s attitudes (evaluations) towards a number of objects of judgment (e.g., 
the partners’ contributions) and P2’s attitudes (evaluations) towards the same objects; and (c) 
the effect of the mediator / moderator functions or variables on the adaptation of the 
individual’s behavior as a result of the total (in)congruity (CAtotal).  
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3.2. A Special Theory: The impact of cultural differences on the application of congruity 
theory to alliance formation  
In this section we consider the effect that cultural differences may have on the general model. 
The literature indicates that culture may influence face-to-face interactions in a number of 
ways. Cultural dimensions have been found to impact managers’ preferences and behavior 
towards business partners (Lee, Shenkar, & Li, 2008; Marshall & Boush, 2001), in particular 
during the negotiation process (e.g., Graham, Evenko, & Rajan, 1992; Lee, Yang, & Graham, 
2006).  
An illustration of the importance of culture as an important factor on international interfirm 
deals regards the acquisition of Volvo Cars by the Chinese car manufacturer Geely. Or in the 
words of Geely’s chairman Mr Li Shufu regarding the post-acquisition process: “[The biggest 
lesson in the first year after buying Volvo is that] you really need to study and understand and 
respect the culture of the company and the culture of the nation and through discussion form 
a consensus.”  (Waldmeir, 2011). 
 It has been suggested that cross-cultural negotiations will tend to achieve lower joint gains 
than intra-cultural negotiations (Brett & Okumura, 1998). Moreover, different cultures may 
support seemingly opposite negotiation approaches, each leading to optimum outcomes under 
given circumstances (Graham et al., 1992). In addition, cultural differences seem to have a 
stronger negative effect on trust building when interacting with new business contacts as the 
partners do not know each other well (Marshall & Boush, 2001).  
Difficulties to go across different corporate cultures may be another illustration, or in the 
words of a senior financial analysis (Thomas Caldwell, Caldwell Financial, Toronto) while 
analysing the low performance and subsequent acquisition of Merrill Lynch by the Bank of 
America under Mr John Thain by the end of 2008: "[Merrill Lynch is] a unique culture. If 
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you come in as an outsider, you'd better be paying attention, because it's a tough game." 
(Farrell and Sender, 2009). 
Lander and Kooning (2013) suggest that the development of trust is based concomitantly on a 
number of domains including the personal sphere and the interaction process. Another related 
finding refers to the long-term orientation of Japanese retailers as an antecedent to trust and 
satisfaction with suppliers and how, as a consequence, Japanese retailers put more effort into 
resolving their differences with suppliers  than searching for new ones (Chung et al., 2006), 
which may be seen as culture-specific behavior. Suggestions for deepening the understanding 
of the negotiation process, particularly in international cross-cultural settings, have been 
made (e.g., Brett & Okumura, 1998). More recently, the importance of understanding the 
motivations and constraints or alternatives of the other party has been highlighted (Malhotra, 
2013). Furthermore, a number of potential sources of conflict have been identified by looking 
at cross-cultural business interactions as well as through comparisons across cultures. Such 
sources of conflict range from differences on culturally-derived or culturally-embedded 
values (Chen, Mannix, & Okumura, 2003; Molinsky, 2007; Tinsley & Pillutla, 1998; Tinsley, 
2001) and business practices or negotiation approaches (Adler, Brahm, & Graham, 1992; 
Graham, 1985; Liu, Friedman, & Hong, 2012), to cognitive styles (Abramson, Lane, Nagai, 
& Takagi, 1993; Adler, Doktor, & Redding, 1986; Redding, 1980) and interaction behaviors 
(Adair, Weingart, & Brett, 2007; Adler et al., 1992; Lee et al., 2006; Liu, Chua, & Stahl, 
2010).  
If we compare the possible effect of a collectivistic versus individualistic culture, it seems 
reasonable to expect that members of collectivist cultures will tend to seek harmony faster 
than members of individualist cultures, as it is part of their cultural behavior to place 
collective concerns above individual ones (Kim, Park, & Suzuki, 1990; Marcus & Le, 2013). 
This may be interpreted as affecting the speed and strength of a desire to return to congruity. 
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In other words, a member of a collectivistic culture can be expected to desire a faster return to 
congruity, compared to a member of an individualistic culture. Hence, the strength to comply 
with the principle of congruity, is culturally dependent. The extent of incongruity is first 
perceived by the party or individual and, subsequently, there is time for adjustment to occur. 
The speed of adjustment will also be culturally dependent. 
In our context, cross-cultural differences can be expected to affect the micro-dynamic stages 
of a sequence of interactions and, hence, the predicted outcome of the alliance formation 
process. More specifically, both the strength of the intention to reach congruity and the speed 
to take action towards that objective can be expected to be culturally dependent. 
Using the general formulation from the previous section - see Formula (1) - and setting the 
moderator function M1 = Cr, we have: 
At=1,1,2=At=0,1,2 + fa (CAtotal, Cr)                  (2)  
where Cr represents cultural differences described by a cultural vector Cr = g (Cr1, Cr2, …, Crn), 
with n as the number of cultural dimensions under consideration. Cr affects both the 
magnitude and the speed of the incongruity adaptation effect. 
It should be noted that other special theories could be derived from the general theory, for 
example, the effect of the gender of the participants on compliance with the principle of 
congruity. 
3.3. An Application of the Special Theory: contrasting mind-sets of managers of 
developed countries and their counterparts in large emerging economies  
Next we illustrate an application of the special theory (see previous Section) to the case of 
alliance formation between managers of diverse mind-sets, that is, managers of firms from 
Developed Countries (DCs) and those of firms from Large Emerging Markets (LEMs). In this 
context, one potential source of disagreement and dispute concerns the contributions to the 
transnational alliance (TA) expected by and of the partners (Stopford & Wells, 1972). The 
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impact of divergent expectations due to diverse objectives or mind-sets has been illustrated in 
the context of entrepreneurs and venture capital managers (Chua & Woodward, 1993). 
Underpinning this idea is the notion that early identification of misunderstandings concerning 
the potential contributions of the partner can increase the ability of managers to intervene and 
resolve any mistrust that might arise, through better communication of their respective 
viewpoints and objectives and through the development of joint solutions. Yan and Gray 
(2001) suggest that the bargaining power of the parties is determined not only by the 
partners’ contributions but also by the context of the negotiation and the strength of the 
relationship. It has also been suggested that the evaluation of the other party’s benefits may 
be linked not just to the relationship situation, but to the negotiators’ personality 
characteristics too (Corfman & Lehmann, 1993). 
Three important issues in international business studies provide the context for this 
application of the special theory. The first concerns the low success rates of TAs, the second 
the growing importance of LEMs in the global arena (De Mattos, Burgess, & Shaw, 2013), 
and the third the importance of commercial biotechnology for both governments and the 
private sector. Moreover, LEMs and high-technology sectors illustrate respectively 
environments of high uncertainty and high complexity. We suggest that the rapidly-changing 
conditions of these environments may affect the judgement of managers and therefore their 
mind-set. LEMs such as Brazil, China, India, Turkey, and Mexico are quickly acquiring 
greater prominence in the global economy (e.g., NIC 2008; O'Neill & Stupnytska, 2009; 
UNCTAD, 2009, 2010; Wilson, Kelston, & Ahmed, 2010) and have consequently attracted 
considerable scholarly attention (e.g., Eichengreen, Gupta, & Kumar, 2010; Lu, Zhou, 
Bruton, & Li, 2010; Kotabe, Parente, & Murray, 2007; Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 
2009; Muller & Kolk, 2010;  Ramamurti & Singh, 2009; Trevino & Mixon Jr. 2004; Wasti, 
2008). This prominence is expected to grow more rapidly over the coming years as firms 
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strive to secure first-mover advantages in LEMs, and benefit from scale economies, location 
advantages and other effects. In addition, contrary to some widely-held assumptions in the 
literature, business opportunities in LEMs are not restricted to low- and medium-technology 
deals. Indeed, LEM-based firms have grown their presence in markets for technology-
intensive products and services (Santos, 2007; UNCTAD, 2010), particularly those from 
Latin America and the transition economies (see Filatotchev, Liu, Buck, & Wright, 2009; 
Murray, Kotabe, & Zhou, 2005; Kotabe et al., 2007; Kotabe, Teegen, Aulakh, Coutinho de 
Arruda, Santillán-Salgado, & Greene, 2000; Siqueira & Bruton, 2010).  
As a result, business deals between firms from LEMs and their counterparts in developed 
countries have increased. Recently, MNEs from LEMs have invested into developed 
countries to source technology and other strategic assets (UNCTAD, 2010). LEMs differ 
from other developing economies in that they generally possess a reasonably good industrial 
infrastructure and have fairly advanced scientific capabilities, even if these are limited to 
universities and research centers, and are generally unavailable on a commercial scale. 
However, LEMs share with other developing countries certain market inefficiencies, such as 
investment-unfriendly regulatory regimes and taxation systems, as well as policies which 
often stifle local entrepreneurship (Dinello & Shaoguang, 2009; Gupta, Hasan, & Kumar, 
2010; World Bank, 2010). Within this context, the ability of firms – be they LEM firms 
looking to acquire technology and other assets from developed-country partners, or 
developed-country firms seeking to tap into the opportunities presented by LEMs – to devise 
mechanisms and tools that help potential sources of conflict to be identified at an early stage 
of TA formation would go a long way towards improving the probability of a successful 
alliance. Based on our review of the literature, we can identify four areas of potential 
incongruity regarding the perceptions of different groups of managers concerning the 
prospective contributions of the developed country partner and, thus, potential sources of 
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conflict between alliance partners. These incongruities relate primarily to the resource-
seeking strategies of the respective firms, namely access to capital, advanced technology, 
technical personnel, and supplementary product lines. 
3.3.1. Transnational alliance partner contributions 
One application of the principle of congruity is to the case of dyadic (two-party) alliances, in 
order to establish in theory a causal link between congruence of expectations (or evaluations) 
regarding the contributions from a prospective partner to the alliance and the likelihood of 
alliance formation.  
From our discussion of the literature, we can extract two main ideas. First, managers 
contemplating a transnational alliance have certain prior expectations of their potential 
partners, especially concerning their respective contributions. Second, these expectations may 
differ amongst alliance partners, or, expressed another way, incongruity may be present. 
Should this prove to be the case, conflict is likely to ensue and the risk of failure may be 
heightened. For the reasons explained above, because of respective institutional and 
environmental differences it is likely that incongruous expectations will be observed between 
developed-country firms and those from emerging markets. This indicates the need for 
managers in such situations to be more cognisant of possible mismatches of expectations 
during the alliance formation process and to be better prepared to deal with them as and when 
they arise.  
There is now a substantial literature on how firms select potential partners on the basis 
of the contribution that the partner can bring to the TA. A review of this literature has helped 
us to identify those potential contributions to a TA which, as the discussions above indicate, 
have the potential to provide a source of incongruity between the respective managers of the 
partner firms. The importance of the contributions of potential partners to an alliance will 
depend on the ongoing strategy of the firms involved, and on the availability of each factor 
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under examination, including the internal resources of participating firms. Dong, Buckley, 
and Mirza (1997) draw attention to differences in the perceived importance of contributions 
between culturally-different foreign collaborators. We can infer from congruity theory 
thinking that it is likely that any manager involved in a potential alliance will have a frame of 
reference (or mind-set) against which he or she will assess the potential contributions of a 
prospective TA partner, possibly allocating objective or subjective weightings to those 
contributions as they are evaluated (Cavusgil, Ghauri, & Akcal, 2013). However, prior 
literature identifying precisely what these contributions are likely to be is somewhat limited. 
Only a limited number of studies provide detailed lists of potential contributions, and only 
few of those consider contributions of developed-country partners (e.g., Beamish, 1987; De 
Mattos, Sanderson, & Ghauri, 2002; Dong et al., 1997; Dong, & Glaister, 2006; Erden, 1997; 
Geringer, 1991; Glaister & Buckley, 1997; , Raveed & Renforth 1983; Stopford & Wells, 
1972; Wright, Filatotchev, Buck, & Bishop, 2002). Within this literature there is little 
consensus A number of other studies do consider partner contributions, but without it being 
their main purpose or focus (see Blodgett, 1991; Chen, Park, & Newburry, 2009; Fagre & 
Wells, 1982). 
Having established that contributions from TA partners, in general, are expected to 
influence the likelihood of successful formation as well as the continuance of a transnational 
alliance, in the next section we turn our attention to specific contributions and the potential 
incongruity of perceptions between TA partners regarding those contributions and hence their 
potential to cause conflict and derail the TA formation process. 
Considering that the general theory (1) and the special theory focusing on cultural differences 
(2), and defining Cr = g (Cr1), i.e., the cultural vector (Cr) is dependent on just one dimension 
(Cr1), which represents the different mind-sets of managers from DCs and their counterparts 
in LEMs, we have: 
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 At=1,1,2=At=0,1,2 + fa (CAtotal, Cr1)…………..(3) 
In this special case, the Attitude of P1 towards P2 at time t=1 (At=1,1,2) is the Attitude of 
P1 towards P2 at time t=0 (At=0,1,2) plus the effect of the cumulative congruity or incongruity, 
which in turn is affected by the different mind-sets (fa) in what relates to determining setting 
the magnitude and speed of the wish to conform with the principle of congruity. Further 
specific propositions could be derived from variants of the special theory of cultural 
differences – for instance, those based on the various dimensions of culture in Hofstede’s 
work (Hofstede, 1980).  Examples include a proposition that the different speed or intensity 
of compliance with the principle of congruity depends on the degree of 
individualism/collectivism of the individuals or teams interacting in the joint venture.  
Similarly it could be proposed that compliance speed or intensity will vary according to the 
cultural distance (psychic distance) between the participants.  
4. Propositions 
Our approach provides a set of testable propositions at general, special and specific levels.  It 
enhances the theoretical understanding of behavior in joint ventures and is complementary to 
the approach based on ‘mutual forbearance’ given by Buckley and Casson (1988). Indeed, the 
two approaches together suggest a means of achieving success in collaborative ventures 
based on a commitment to understanding the culture and mind-set of partners and 
maximising congruity in order to increase the commitment of all partners to the venture.  
Such an approach can reduce the ex ante risk of (international) inter-cultural joint ventures. 
We develop below a number of propositions to guide the necessary empirical testing. 
The propositions derive from the general theory as well as from further specifications of the 
special theory. Regarding the former, propositions may be raised regarding moderators (Mi) 
different from those already covered by the special theory (i.e., culture) or the application of 
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the special theory (i.e., mind-set). An example of such a proposition drawing on the general 
theory is a special theory on the effect of gender differences. 
Indirect recognition that there may be gender-related factors affecting women entrepreneurs 
are indicated by the European Commission initiatives and the 2012 report (European 
Commission, 2012): “The aim [of this report] is to follow the development of the number of 
women entrepreneurs and of gender segregated statistics and thereby make the contribution 
of women entrepreneurs to society more visible.” The report carries on by pointing out the 
problems in identifying the contributions of female entrepreneurs (and by implication, female 
managers) because many countries do not provide business-related statistics differentiated by 
gender. 
Proposition 1: Considering a sequence of interactions and individuals of similar 
cultural background, the wish intensity as well as the speed to reach 
congruity following incongruent initial valuations of prospective partners’ 
contributions to an alliance will be gender-dependent.  
 
The above proposition may give rise to a number of hypotheses that will consider different 
outcomes when considering, for instance, different cultural dimensions.  
Or using the general theory, refer to formula (1), and defining ∑m Mm = Mg , we 
have: 
At=1,1,2=At=0,1,2 + fa (CAtotal,  Mg),  
Where:  At=1,1,2 is the attitude of P1 towards P2 at time t=1; At=0,1,2 is the attitude of P1 
towards P2 at time t=0; fa = function represents the congruity and adaptation effects (both 
speed and wish intensity to reach congruity); CAtotal=∑k CAck’,1 + ∑k’ CAck,2, represents the 
cumulative congruity or incongruity regarding the contributions of each partner; and Mg  
represents the potential moderation of gender on the adaptation of the congruity function. 
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Moreover, regarding the special theory, propositions may be specified further along the lines 
of a number of diverse dimensions of culture, see the cultural vector presented previously, for 
example, Hofstede’s dimensions such as collectivism/individualism, or cultural distance.  
As suggested by Brett and Okumura (1998, p.496) “The linkage of goals to self as opposed to 
the collective and the emphasis on personal needs as opposed to social obligations suggest 
that individualists should be more self-interested in negotiations than collectivists.” This 
indicates that differences between individualistic and collectivistic cultures are expected to be 
significant in the context of cross-cultural negotiation interactions.  
Below are examples of such propositions. 
 
Proposition 2a: Considering a sequence of interactions and individuals with 
cultural backgrounds of varying degrees of collectivism/individualism, the 
wish intensity as well as the speed to reach congruity following incongruent 
initial evaluations of prospective partners’ contributions to an alliance will 
differ.  
 
Or, using the special theory, refer to Formula (2), and defining Cr = Cc/i , we have: 
At=1,1,2=At=0,1,2 + fa (CAtotal,  Cc/i) 
 Where:  At=1,1,2 is the attitude of P1 towards P2 at time t=1; At=0,1,2 is the attitude of P1 
towards P2 at time t=0; fa = function represents the congruity and adaptation effects (both 
speed and wish intensity to reach congruity); CAtotal=∑k CAck’,1 + ∑k’ CAck,2, represents the 
cumulative congruity or incongruity regarding the contributions of each partner; and Cc/i  
represents the potential moderation of the cultural bi-polar dimension of 
collectivism/individualism on the adaptation of the congruity function. 
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Different expectations and procedures dependent on the local cultural environment have been 
indicated as determining the chances of success of business ventures (Buckley, Clegg, & Tan, 
2006). Thus, considering a general culture-related construct (i.e. cultural distance): 
 
Proposition 2b: Considering a sequence of interactions and individuals with 
different cultural backgrounds having a non-zero cultural distance, the wish 
intensity as well as the speed to reach congruity following incongruent 
initial valuations of prospective partners’ contributions to an alliance will 
differ.  
 
Or using as previously the special theory, refer to formula (2), and defining Cr = 
CC-D , we have: 
At=1,1,2=At=0,1,2 + fa (CAtotal,  CC-D) 
 Where:  At=1,1,2 is the Attitude of P1 towards P2 at time t=1; At=0,1,2 is the Attitude of P1 
towards P2 at time t=0; fa = function represents the congruity and adaptation effects (both 
speed and wish intensity to reach congruity); CAtotal=∑k CAck’,1 + ∑k’ CAck,2, represents the 
cumulative congruity or incongruity regarding the contributions of each partner; and CC-D 
represents the potential moderation of the cultural distance on the adaptation of the congruity 
function. 
The impact of discordant mindsets may be illustrated with the case of KKR (Kohlberg Kravis 
Roberts), the renowned corporate buy-out investor. One of the three founders split-up after 
over ten years of joint operations due among other factors to “differences between the hard-
driving business style of the young cousins [i.e., Henry Kravis and his cousin George 
Roberts] and the quieter approach of their former mentor [Jerome Kohlberg]” (Sender, 2011). 
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An evolving mindset has been highlighted as important in todays’ world. The implicit 
implication is that different mindsets coexist in todays’ business environment and, as pointed 
out by Gupta and Govindarajan (2002), they operate differently, some more successfully than 
others. A proposition addressing this issue is suggested below. 
Another dimension, paralleling the idea of mindset, is an executive’s personality trait, as 
illustrated by the case of Wipro, the Indian giant computer services provider and their joint 
CEOs, Mr Suresh Vaswani and Mr Girish Paranjpe. Explaining their dissimilar approaches 
and its positive effect we quote Mr Paranjpe: "Since we have different personalities, we find 
people and clients interact differently with us. So that becomes a good tactic. Some clients 
respond better to me and others to Suresh [i.e., Mr Suresh Vaswani].” (Leahy, 2008). 
We could create propositions to be tested for the application of the special theory regarding 
mind-sets, which parallels what we proposed previously regarding cultural dimensions, as 
follows. 
Proposition 3: Considering a sequence of interactions and individuals with 
different mind-sets, initial valuations of prospective partners’ contributions 
as well as the wish intensity and the speed to reach congruity following 
incongruent initial evaluations of prospective partners’ contributions to an 
alliance will differ.  
 
Or, using as previously the special theory, refer to formula (3), and defining Cr1 = 
Cm-s , we have: 
At=1,1,2=At=0,1,2 + fa (CAtotal,  Cm-s) 
 Where:  At=1,1,2 is the Attitude of P1 towards P2 at time t=1; At=0,1,2 is the Attitude of P1 
towards P2 at time t=0; fa = function represents the congruity and adaptation effects (both 
speed and wish intensity to reach congruity); CAtotal=∑k CAck’,1 + ∑k’ CAck,2, represents the 
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cumulative congruity or incongruity regarding the contributions of each partner; and Cm-s 
represents the potential moderation of the differing mind-sets on the adaptation of the 
congruity function. 
 
The above propositions may generate a number of hypotheses aimed at testing the different 
theoretical levels (i.e., general theory, special theory, and application of the special theory). 
We theorize that variations in the context as well as variations regarding the timing and order 
of the interactions in a sequence may lead to diverse outcomes. Both quantitative and 
qualitative techniques may be used to test and develop the theory. Regarding the former, 
simulations of business interactions seem an appropriate research instrument to achieve a 
better control of the parameters considered (e.g., Brett and Okumura, 1998; Graham et al., 
1992). Surveys regarding cross-cultural business interaction practices may also be employed 
to test the theory under specific circumstances (e.g., Rao & Schmidt, 1998).  The analysis of 
secondary panel data may provide additional insights particularly in relation to comparisons 
of two or more country environments and cultures. In issues that concern qualitative 
techniques, case studies could also be used to detail the micro-dynamic procedures used by 
practitioners, bringing the theory closer to questions arising from current and novel real-life 
managerial challenges and empirical solutions (e.g., Buckley, 2002). A multidisciplinary 
approach could also play an important role in developing this theory, particularly the use of 
disciplines such as anthropology (Buckley & Chapman, 1996). 
 
5. Conclusions 
Based on the principle of congruity, this paper seeks to advance understanding of individual-
to-individual micro-dynamics of two-party interactions in the final stages of a transnational 
alliance (TA) formation. More specifically, using the principle of congruity we develop a 
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general theory that considers the effect of a mismatch of expectations between prospective 
partners about the contributions of both partners plus the partners’ attitudes towards each 
other on the likelihood of alliance formation. We also develop a special theory that considers 
cultural differences as influencing managers’ wish to follow the principle of congruity, taking 
into account both the intensity and speed of adjustment. Finally, we present an application of 
the special case which reflects the effect of different mind-sets between managers of firms 
from developed countries (DC) and their counterparts in large emerging markets.  
Recent studies propose similar paths, particularly on interpersonal interaction (e.g., Lander & 
Kooning, 2013). The potential for a successful TA can be significantly influenced by the 
perceptions and expectations of the principal parties involved, as well as by their attitudes.  
The reasons why misconceptions arise appear to be related, at least in part, to differences in 
national culture and business environments.   
 
5.1. Managerial Relevance 
Our study implies that managers who enter into discussions on the formation of transnational 
alliances should focus on communicating clearly and explicitly what resources they intend to 
commit to provide, and what they expect to receive from the arrangement, since this is likely 
to be a significant source of misunderstanding and potential conflict; this should occur either 
during the allying process, or once the alliance has been agreed.  
This paper also contributes by raising awareness of the importance of managers being 
cognizant of possible mismatches of expectations during the alliance formation process, and 
the importance of being better prepared to deal with any potential mismatches. Preemption or 
early identification of issues that could lead to misunderstandings concerning potential 
partner contributions can increase the ability of managers to intervene and resolve any 
mistrust that might arise, through better communication of respective viewpoints and 
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objectives, and through the development of joint solutions. Therefore, if areas of high 
conflict-generation potential can be identified in advance during the informal stages of TA 
formation, and then evaluated and acted upon early by managers, such misconceptions can be 
addressed to minimise their effects. The use of checklists and other tools that focus attention 
on potential sources of misconceptions, such as the contributions expected of a partner, may 
complement more informal efforts to identify and take steps to mitigate the effects of 
misunderstandings and conflict, and to promote a self-reinforcing dynamic of mutual trust-
building.  
We propose that an attitude of mutual commitment and trust-building may be accomplished 
by unilateral or multilateral efforts by the parties involved to understand the standpoint of the 
other party. In so doing, managers should be able to reach a better understanding of the 
consequences of their respective demands that might appear, on the surface at least, to be 
associated with national, 'taken-for-granted', mind-sets. With this in mind, pre-alliance 
formation discussions with prospective collaborators could follow a step-wise approach, in 
which (i) the partners identify the contributions they expect to make towards and receive 
from the other party (perhaps using checklists), (ii) these contributions are ranked or scored 
by managers according to the relative importance to their firm, and (iii) these rankings are 
shared between the partners in order to draw attention to where any incongruity of 
expectation is greatest, and therefore where further dialogue is needed.  One possible 
limitation is that culturally-embedded factors that affect business interactions can be expected 
to have different speeds of change (Fang, Worm, & Tung, 2008). 
5.2. Relevance for Policy Formulation 
This approach may be considered by policy-makers when they seek to promote alliances. In 
this context, a similar use of checklists as suggested above to managers may be helpful in 
seeking clarity about the respective positions of TA partners. Many governments around the 
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world are looking to promote high-technology and high value-added sectors as a key 
development objective, while emerging economies not only have untapped markets for final 
products but can also be seen as high-demand markets for novel technologies. It is 
recommended that mechanisms are established that help to clarify the objectives of 
companies in these types of sectors regarding the establishment of TAs with foreign firms, 
particularly among those government agencies charged with promoting international 
technology transfer through the use of transnational alliances. In addition, the support of 
managers of small and medium-sized businesses in terms of training and increased awareness 
about problems that may be caused by incongruities of expectations should assist with efforts 
to attract foreign investors and new-technology developers to emerging economies. At the 
same time, the dissemination among emerging economies of innovative products deriving 
from new product development initiatives in advanced countries could increase the 
generation of revenue amongst technology-based firms.  
 
Notes 
1
 This approach simplifies the three-level approach adopted in previous studies (e.g., 
Tannenbaum, 1956). 
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Table 1  
Possible Congruence of Evaluations in a Two Level Model 
 
 
 
CA1,2,C1,2 
 
A2,C1,2a 
 
A1,C1,2b 
 + 0 
+ 0c -1 
0 -1 0 
 
* a P2 attitude towards C1,2 , bP1 attitude towards C1,2 ,  
c 
‘0’ = congruous, ‘-1’ = incongruous 
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Likelihood 
of alliance 
formation 
Total level of 
congruity (or 
incongruity) of 
evaluations  
 towards P1’s and 
P2’s  potential 
contributions to 
the alliance 
P1 
P2 
Resultant 
P1’s Attitude 
towards P2  
and vice-
versa  
 
C1,2 C2,2 C3,2 ….. Ck,2 
 
C1,1 C2,1 C3,1 ….. Ck’,1 
 
Evaluations of P2 towards P1’s contributions 
Evaluations of P2 towards P2’s own contributions 
 
Evaluations of P1 towards P1’s own contributions 
 
Evaluations of P1 towards P2’s contributions 
P1 
P2 
Initial attitude of P1 towards P2 
P1’s initial frame of reference (FR1) 
Initial attitude of P2 towards P1 
Figure 1:  
Influence of Congruity of Evaluations / Expectations regarding Partner Contributions and Likelihood of Alliance Formation 
Key:   
Ck’,1 : P1 contributions to the alliance 
Ck,2 : P2 contributions to the alliance 
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Figure 2 
Change in attitude of P1 towards P2, following an incongruent evaluation of P2 regarding P2’s own potential 
contribution 1 (C1,2) 
 
 
 
 
Initial setting (t=0): Attitude of P1 towards P2 is neutral, Attitude of P1 towards C1,2 is positive, Attitude of P2 
towards C1,2 is neutral. 
 
 
 
 
Subsequent setting (t=1): Attitude of P1 towards P2 becomes negative following the principle of congruity  
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